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Abstract 
This paper explores the impact of Europe’s existing institutional framework on the degree of 
macroeconomic disparity in the Eurozone. It draws on analysis of the costs of this framework 
as well as of the benefits of European economic and monetary unification. It also highlights 
how these costs and benefits are distributed geographically. 
There is a fundamental difference between the economic advantages of European economic 
and monetary unification, and the costs and risks associated with the system set up to promote 
unification. Many of the benefits of economic and monetary unification will only really be felt 
in the medium or even long term. In contrast the impact of the costs incurred by EMU 
operation is increasingly apparent – and more so as time passes – mainly penalizing the least 
developed European countries. 
The thrust of this study is that in its current form the EMU’s institutional framework is not 
viable. It encourages the accumulation of lasting imbalances at the expense of Europe’s least 
developed nations. While giving rise to substantial costs and risks for these countries, it 
jeopardizes the institutions and mechanisms which would enable them to cope. Imbalances 
associated with the operation of the EU give rise to negative externalities for the Union as a 
whole. The emergence of global finance – to which the Single European Act contributed – 
reveals and accentuates the Community’s structural imbalance. To maintain consistent 
operation of the EMU, the burden of these costs and risks must be shouldered collectively, 
through the coordination and centralization of economic policies and the development of 
budgetary federalism. But such conditions are extremely difficult to achieve and involve 
significant costs – some monetary, others not – that should be borne by the most prosperous 
European countries. These costs give rise to an uncooperative attitude, compromising the 
EMU as a viable system. One solution which merits consideration would be a reappraisal – on 
a negotiated and collectively approved basis - of certain aspects of Europe’s existing 
institutional framework. 
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Introduction 
 
The recent Euro zone crisis has led to increasing awareness of the disparities in economic 
conditions and competitive positions among member countries of the zone. These disparities, 
which underscore the diversity and rivalry among member countries and even among 
European institutions, give rise to questions about the viability of the European economic and 
monetary unification process. 
 
The European economic and monetary unification is an extremely ambitious historical 
experience given not only the number of countries involved in the process but also the 
structural imbalances and development gaps between these countries. In fact, fully established 
monetary unions in market economies have always been made up of territorial entities within 
the same nation. This is in particular the case with the Italian and German monetary 
unification in the second half of the nineteenth century. In addition, the monetary unification 
of these territorial entities was accompanied by their economic and political unification that 
helped to reduce disparities and increase homogenization. 
 
The European economic and monetary unification is based on an institutional framework 
including not only the founding treaties of the European Union - the Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
and Amsterdam Treaty (1997) - as it is often suggested - but also the Treaty on the Single 
European Act (1986) which established the single market, the European financial zone and 
the full liberalization of capital flow. Although the Single Act reforms were not initially 
linked explicitly to the prospect of establishing a common currency, European monetary 
unification is inconceivable without first establishing a single market for goods and financial 
services. To understand the causes of the Euro zone crisis, it is essential to consider also the 
consequences of the Single European Act on the economies of member countries. 
 
Total liberalization of capital flow constitutes a loophole in the logic and dynamics that 
characterize European integration process since its inception. Indeed, this reform opens the 
way to financial globalization and to finance capital expansion which weakens the role of the 
States and economic policies. Meanwhile, the European unification project was a project 
borne by European States with the implicit purpose of reproducing at a higher level the policy 
mix hitherto conducted at the national level. The project's success depended on the 
willingness of States to gradually give up whole sectors of their prerogatives in the area of 
macroeconomic policies with a view to reconstituting at the supranational level - European 
level - the coherence of national policy- mix. It was mainly the "creative imbalance" model 
(“Monnet” method) that conceptualized, or even "guided" the European project from Rome 
Treaty (1957) to Maastricht Treaty (1992). ‘Securitization” of public debt that comes with the 
complete liberalization of capital flow of the Single European Act is the main lever of the 
growing ascendancy of finance capital over public authorities. 
 
The European project is also based on "differentiation" of the European area in relation to the 
rest of the world economy. This "differentiation" is materialized particularly in the abolition 
of customs barriers between European countries and the establishment of common external 
tariffs. It is also reflected in the establishment of common institutions consistent with the 
Community structure - European Court of Justice, Court of Auditors, European Investment 
Bank ... .- and more especially in the implementation of common policies. One of the key 
objectives of the project was to promote the strengthening of European capital. Trade 
liberalization under the auspices of the WTO - which accompanies globalization of 
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production of European businesses and the expansion of financial globalization in Europe -
questions the idea of "differentiation" of the European community area with regards to the 
rest of the world economy. 
 
Many studies carried out especially in the preparatory stages of euro implementation 
highlighted significant economic benefits of the European economic and monetary unification 
(Rapport Emerson, 1990). These benefits are firstly microeconomic in nature, resulting from 
the elimination of currency conversion costs and reduction on exchange loss coverage. These 
cost economies would facilitate improvement in the competitive positions of European firms 
and accelerate growth by stimulating investment. The expected benefits of the common 
currency are also macroeconomic in nature. It helps member countries to considerably 
alleviate the constraint of the balance of trade. It also enables consolidation of the single 
market and promotes better coordination of other branches of economic policy. Finally, the 
benefits of monetary unification are also geo-economic and geopolitical. The European 
monetary unification would improve the balance of power for Europe to negotiate with the 
US an exchange policy more in line with European interest. More generally, it promotes - 
given the effect of its size and synergy - the emergence of a “Europe-power”.  
 
Significant literature has also been written about the costs and risks of the common currency 
especially for the less developed European countries. These costs and risks include the 
economic slowdown resulting from the effort to meet the Maastricht criteria; the 
consequences of asymmetric shocks, the effects related to the loss of key instruments of 
economic policy for member countries; insufficient co-ordination of economic policies and 
lack of well-developed budgetary federalism (BARTHE M.-A., 2003). 
Some of the expected benefits of the common currency were found to be exaggerated and 
even illusory. This is mainly the case with microeconomic benefits. Growing profitability and 
competitiveness of European businesses has not been a factor for boosting investment and 
growth in Europe. On the contrary, the production and financial globalization context 
consolidated since the mid-80s with reforms of the Single Act tends to promote relocation of 
investment by large European companies, a factor of anemia in growth. The common 
currency has considerably eased the constraint of the balance of trade and removed the risk of 
speculative attacks against national currencies. But at the same time “securitization” of public 
debt resulting from the Single Act reforms has gendered more serious risks than the previous 
ones, the risk of speculative attacks against sovereign debts.  
There are also fundamental differences between the benefits and costs as well as the risks of 
the common currency. Many of the benefits of economic and monetary unification can be felt 
only if the EMU succeeds in the long run. It is essentially the case for being able to negotiate 
with the Americans over exchange policy in the interest of Europe and the emergence of 
“Europe-power”. Moreover, the benefits of the common currency are unequally distributed 
among member countries: the consolidation of the single market and the emergence of a 
“Europe-power” are more in the interest of the most developed European countries. In 
contrast the impact of the costs incurred by EMU operation is increasingly apparent – and 
more so as time passes – mainly penalizing the least developed European countries.  This is 
mainly the case with the consequences of the operation of a single market and with those of 
asymmetric shocks. 
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Our study is concerned with the impact of the current European institutional framework in 
relation to the macroeconomic imbalances within the Euro zone. It is based on the analysis of 
costs and benefits of this framework and their distribution among member countries. 
 
The thrust of this study is that in its current form the EMU’s institutional framework is not 
viable. It encourages the accumulation of lasting imbalances at the expense of Europe’s least 
developed nations. While giving rise to substantial costs and risks for these countries, it 
jeopardizes the institutions and mechanisms which would enable them to cope. Imbalances 
associated with the operation of the EU give rise to negative externalities for the Union as a 
whole. The emergence of global finance – to which the Single European Act contributed – 
reveals and accentuates the Community’s structural imbalance. To maintain consistent 
operation of the EMU, the burden of these costs and risks must be shouldered collectively, 
through the coordination and centralization of economic policies and the development of 
budgetary federalism. But such conditions are extremely difficult to achieve and involve 
significant costs – some monetary, others not – that should be borne by the most prosperous 
European countries. These costs give rise to an uncooperative attitude, compromising the 
EMU as a viable system. One solution which merits consideration would be a reappraisal – on 
a negotiated and collectively approved basis - of certain aspects of Europe’s existing 
institutional framework. 
 
The first part of this study (I) analyzes the reasons why the European institutional framework 
is inconsistent. The second part (II) specifies the conditions for consistent running of the 
European Union as well as the difficulties and obstacles hindering its success.  
I/ The operation of the EU lacks coherence: accumulation of lasting 
imbalances due to costs at the expense of less developed European countries 
that have negative externalities for the whole Union. 
The operation costs of the EU result from the economic and monetary unification process of 
an area characterized by significant structural and cyclical differentiation and gaps in 
development levels. 
The structural differentiation of the European Area – which is getting worse with the 
successive enlargements of the euro zone – entails disparities in structural inflation rates, 
varied specializations of the production system, different sensitivities of exports to price 
competitiveness and differences in financial and real structures. 
The monetary unification of an area that is characterized by cyclical and structural disparities 
can lead to a differentiation in the effects of a common monetary policy on member countries. 
Every EU country regardless of its level of development can suffer from the consequences of 
this incoherence (GRUBER T., OHR R., 1997). 
However, most of the running costs and risks of the EU are generally borne by the less 
developed countries. Firstly, it is about costs associated with the single market and the 
European economic policy rules (a). Secondly, it concerns the risk of asymmetric shocks and 
costs associated with the European policy mix. These costs and risks significantly reduce the 
possibility of establishing stabilizing policies (b). Operating costs of the EU are the root cause 
of growing disequilibria which give rise to negative externalities for the entire Union (c). 
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a/ The process of European Economic and Monetary Unification (EMU) engenders costs 
in terms of growth and competitiveness in less developed countries. 
…Costs associated with the single market 
The costs of the European institutional device are to be linked primarily with the operation of 
the single market. 
The establishment of the single market led to the removal of all non-tariff barriers to free 
movements of goods within the EU – technical and sanitary controls - as well as access to 
public procurements hitherto reserved for national companies. The latter represent about 10% 
of the EU GDP. The single market reforms are accompanied by the strengthening of 
competition policy role which is progressively playing a dominant role within the European 
“common” policies. The main purpose of competition policy is to prevent the State from 
“distorting” the free play of market forces by granting aids especially to public companies. 
The single market and competition policy work together to the detriment of countries in the 
“periphery” of the euro zone with less efficient production systems. They freeze competitive 
positions and reproduce, or even compound development inequalities. The single market 
promotes increasing trade balance deficits of less developed countrie. The single market thus 
worsens the consequences of globalization on competitiveness of the Euro zone “peripheral” 
countries. These countries’ higher structural inflation rates are an additional factor of 
degrading competitiveness due to the fact that they cannot be compensated by depreciating 
the euro exchange rate. 
Both the FDI - that capital flow liberalization was supposed to promote - and the substantial 
increase in structural and regional funds could enable EU “peripheral” countries to face the 
single market shock. As a matter of fact, the FDI is not directed to these countries which have 
high wage costs, overvalued currency and sluggish growth rates. It is rather directed to 
Western and Central European countries which are not yet Euro zone members and even – 
increasingly - to the rapidly growing South-Eastern Asian countries with very low wage 
levels. The increase in structural and regional funds failed on its own to reduce the gaps in 
development levels. The receiving countries are also to blame for the failure. Besides, the 
economic weight of these funds decreases considerably for the ancient member countries 
following successive EU enlargements and the consequent increase in the number of 
beneficiaries. Thus, neither the FDI nor the structural and regional funds which were likely to 
mitigate the negative consequences of the single market, produce the expected effects. 
Lack of market outlets associated not only with the single market but also with competition 
from newly industrialized countries (NIC) affects investment rate (Portugal) as well as the 
quality of investment projects (Spain, Greece): real estate and tourism investments are 
multiplied while they do not contribute to improve competitiveness. 
- Costs linked with the European economic policy rules 
Monetary unification of a multi-state area raises the problem of choosing economic policy 
rules for the Union. These rules can only be those of the dominant countries. They give 
priority to price stability and a “strong” euro. The monetary unification of the European area 
based on the Maastricht Treaty clauses, enhanced by the Stability Pact, generates increasing 
costs linked to structural heterogeneity and inequality in levels of development of member   
countries. 
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These costs are related to pro-cyclical effects of aligning fiscal and budgetary policy of less 
developed countries with economic policy standards of countries with strong currencies in a 
context of weak growth and rising unemployment. These policies increase the risk of social 
shocks. They also slow down the pace of less developed countries’ growth while the EMU bet 
success was conditioned to the maintenance of growth differentials in favour of their 
development catching-up process. The problem is more with the EU’s exchange rate policy. 
The euro appreciation policy promotes the loss of export market shares for “peripheral” 
countries as well as for Italy and France due to higher price sensitivity of their exports. The 
policy of a “strong” euro thus contributes to the anemic growth in Europe (RICHES-
FLORES, 2004).  
The costs of these policies materialize the effects of domination of leading countries 
“structure” and they can also exist in the absence of a monetary union. Thus, the alignment of 
the European countries monetary policy with the German monetary policy is an essential fact 
in the operation of the European monetary system (EMS). However, if corrective mechanisms 
are not installed, the establishment of the EMU will tend to perpetuate and stiffen this 
structural influence by making it impossible for less developed countries to adapt – even 
marginally- their economic policy to their own needs. 
Low real interest rates resulting from higher inflation rates in Southern European countries 
and the financialization phenomenon have both masked for a long time, the consequences of 
the single market and the European economic policy rules. They have promoted particularly, 
the maintenance of high investment and growth rates through resorting to leverage by public 
and private agents. The debt burden, worsened considerably by the “subprime” crisis is the 
fulcrum of recent attacks against sovereign debt. 
b/ The operation of the EU engenders costs linked with the inability of establishing 
stabilizing polices and the European policy mix 
Based on the conditions set by the Maastricht Treaty, the European Monetary Unification 
creates costs connected with the question of member countries being able to establish 
stabilization policies. 
The monetary unification of this area leads to the permanent loss of the ability for member 
countries to influence internal and external value of the currency and short term interest rates. 
This loss entails costs especially in the case of divergent macro-economic conditions of 
member countries which would require a differentiation of the internal and external monetary 
policy with regards to the situation of different countries. 
The Literature on Optimum Currency Zones (OCZ) can throw light on consequences for 
member countries of losing instruments of economic policy, and especially of exchange rate 
in case of asymmetric shock (BOURGUINAT H., 1995; BROCINER A., 1994). Low 
manpower mobility in Europe and almost inexistent budgetary federalism increase costs of 
asymmetric shocks. Meanwhile, heterogeneous specializations and structural inequalities of 
European countries increase asymmetric shocks risk and more so as monetary unification 
leads to reinforcing heterogeneity and structural inequalities. This is the lesson we can derive 
from the experience of Federal states. Krugman (KRUGMAN P., 1993) shows that 
comparative advantages as well as agglomeration externalities have led American states to 
specialize in some products they exchange with their neighbors. That increases vulnerability 
to asymmetric shocks of States having inadapted specializations. The effects of these shocks 
last so long as specializations are maintained for a long time. So, the gap of growth rates of 
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the American States is wide. Certain States do not really have any increase in employment 
rate for the last four decades. Others have recorded average annual growth rates of 5%. If 
unemployment rate gap between States is not high, it is due to a strong labour mobility 
(ATKINSON A. B, BLANCHARD O. E., 1992). 
The negative consequences of abandoning essential instruments of economic stabilization are 
clear, even within the framework of the EMS whose operation was yet based on voluntary but 
revocable abandon of the implementation by member states of the monetary policy. Thus 
during the summer of 1993, the refusal to envisage a modification of the FF/DM parity within 
the framework of a rigorous monetary policy led by Bundesbank - while the economic 
situation in France and Germany diverged (need to sustain growth in Germany in order to take 
care of the re-unification, need to boost growth in France in order to absorb unemployment) - 
led to the EMS crisis and the devaluation of the FF. The current crisis of sovereign debts in 
Europe shows even more strikingly, the consequences of the loss of the exchange rate 
instrument for the affected countries. 
The current European policy mix engenders on its own, costs related to the incapacity of 
establishing a satisfactory coordination among different sectors of economic policy. 
Centralizing only monetary policy transfers - given the low manpower mobility and the 
resistance to downward pressure on wages - the adjustment pressure to the budgetary policy 
by increasing the temptation of excessive deficits. In fact, a centralized monetary policy 
removes the possibility for member countries to secure revenues through ‘seignior age’. It 
also removes the national currency depreciation sanction which would discredit any reckless 
budgetary policy in the eyes of public opinion. The temptation of raising public deficit grows 
within the framework of a full monetary union especially for less developed countries. That 
can be explained by two main reasons: on the one hand, the interest rates of common currency 
denominated debt are lower than those of a debt denominated in the countries’ currencies; and 
on the other hand, the member countries can no longer benefit from a “captive” market to 
place their debt following the European financial systems reform (MASSON P. R, TAYLOR 
M.P, 1994). 
 The temptation of excessive deficit due to the co-existence of a centralized monetary policy 
and national budgetary policies inevitably leads to the setting of rules for public deficits 
which when the “bar is put too high,” as it is the case with the EMU framework, remove any 
flexibility in the policy mix of the Union. 
The establishment of rules for public finances is an expedient that results from the lack of 
willingness especially on the part of countries with strong currencies to move towards the 
path of coordinating or even centralizing economic policies and strengthening budgetary 
federalism. 
 It is generally accepted that the rule of 3% on budget deficit constitutes an obstacle to 
establishing not only “active” but also stabilizing budgetary policies. Several economic 
studies have been devoted to the negative impact the loss of the Union’s policy mix 
stabilizing capacity on the collective well-being. Here are some illustrative examples of these 
negative results:  
Since the exchange rate instrument is not available within a monetary union, only the use of 
budgetary policy can help to cope with an asymmetric shock of demand (VAN DER PLOEG, 
F. 1993). Similarly, it could sometimes be necessary to lower the interest rates within the 
Euro zone. Such a strategy can only be implemented on the condition that some countries 
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practice restrictive budgetary policies. This will require taking into account the economic 
situation of different countries on a cooperative basis. Finally, it is possible that monetary 
policy alone is not enough to deal with a given situation. For instance, if a country’s balance 
of trade is on deficit while its currency is undervalued, it’s the budgetary instrument that 
should be used between countries either at a federal level or on a coordinated basis (MUET P-
A., 1995). 
Last but not least, the hybrid nature of the European policy mix leads to a differentiation 
factor increasing heterogeneity in the macro-economic policy of European countries with 
respect to their social and fiscal policies. Centralizing monetary policy only – given the low 
mobility of labour factor and the 3% limit set by the Stability Pact – restricts any form of 
leverage to social and especially to fiscal policy. This trend encourages “beggar thy 
neighbour” behavior, with European states attempting to make their national space more 
competitive and more attractive by compressing salaries and by lowering fiscal pressure, 
which in turn benefits the most mobile production factors, in particular the capital factor. The 
upward tendency of the euro against dollar since 2002 encourages this trend as well. Fiscal 
competition poses the problem of the sustainability of taxes on the least mobile factors and 
involves the risk of reducing the fiscal attractiveness of all European countries (“snowball 
effect”). Lastly, it contracts the size of the public sector and damages the political unity of the 
EU. As for “social” competition, it fosters disaffection of public opinion for the single 
currency.  
The uncooperative policies of “competitive” devaluations of the 1970s are thus replaced by 
the uncooperative policies of fiscal and social competition which are encouraged by the 
current European policy mix. But unlike the former, policies of fiscal and social competition 
can also be practiced – and it is being increasingly done - by the more developed European 
countries. 
c/ Costs associated with the European institutional framework and growing inequalities 
within the euro zone. 
The costs and risks associated with the operation of the EU lead to the accumulation of 
imbalances at the expense of less developed European countries. These costs are related to: 
-  The amplification of current accounts balance and balance of trade deficits; 
- The growing indebtedness of public and private agents. 
Current account deficits of peripheral countries in the euro zone lead in return to surpluses for 
the countries in the “Center”. There is considerable deterioration in the current accounts 
balances in Southern Europe countries: 20.163 million euro deficit for Portugal in 2008, 
against a surplus of 224 million in 1993; 104.413 million deficit for Spain in 2008, against a 
deficit of 4.861 in 1993. The data for Italy is a deficit of 53,593 in 2008 against a surplus of 
8.152 in 1993. Within the Euro zone, two countries – Germany and the Netherlands – are net 
exporters, up to 110 and 150 billion euros respectively (2008) (ROUBEN H., 2010). Two 
great relay countries have relatively balanced accounts. Italy which imports from these two 
countries and exports to France, Spain and Greece; France which imports mainly from 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands and compensates its deficit within the euro zone with 
the surplus of its extra-zone trade. Finally three countries record a trade deficit: Spain, 
Portugal and Greece. The new element in the balance of trade situation of the euro zone 
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countries is that the so called “relay” countries, France - one of the two driving forces of the 
European integration – and Italy are now gradually becoming chronic importers. 
The current account deficits of less developed countries correspond with the financial deficits 
of private agents - firms and households - and of the public sector. They are funded, given the 
weakness of the FDI flow, by leverage mostly from banks of the more developed European 
countries. 
So far, discussions have focused on the problem of public debt. However, the increase of 
private debt involves risks just as serious for the banks and therefore for their countries of 
origin – last resort lenders “constraints”. In fact, the increasing public debts into which private 
debts are transformed (the case of Ireland and to a lesser extent, Spain) provokes attacks 
against sovereign debts. These attacks reinforce heterogeneity of the euro zone. Debt of the 
less developed countries, particularly Southern European countries, is mainly private. Private 
debt represents 87% of debt for Spain, 85 % for Portugal and 58% for Greece. Besides, 
Spain’s and Portugal’s rates of indebtedness (private and public debt/PIB) are higher than that 
of Greece which is currently in the focus of financial markets: 506%, 479% and 296% of the 
GDP respectively (LAPAVITSAS C. et alii, 2010). 
Monetary unification of a multi-state area creates a de facto solidarity within this area. The 
result is that current imbalances which affect less developed countries generate negative 
externalities for the entire Union and especially for the more prosperous countries: 
- They can affect the credibility of the monetary policy and therefore the internal and external 
value of the single currency, key variables of the economic policy (VAN DER PLOEG, 
1993). 
- They put pressure in favour of questioning the economic policy rules on which the European 
monetary unification process was committed. These rules are those of more developed 
countries and conform to their “structure” preferences. 
Accumulation of imbalances and the growing indebtedness which weaken bank’s position 
make the ECB to review the modalities and certain principles of the single monetary policy. 
The no-bail-out rule is implicitly questioned. This situation provokes criticism in dominant 
European countries. “Last but not least”, the latter are made to take up a major part of the 
responsibility in the aid plans for the countries in need.  
Thus, while the costs associated with running the EU are borne mainly by less developed 
countries – and more recently and to a lesser extent by France and Italy - the imbalances they 
generate are beginning to create significant and increasing expenses for the dominant 
countries. 
 
II/ Conditions for a coherent functioning of the EU, difficulties and 
obstacles 
The negative spillovers created by the growing imbalances related to the functioning of the 
EU make it necessary to go towards a more integrated European policy mix (a). However an 
increased integration of the European policy mix faces many economic obstacles, as well as 
social and political ones, which makes its realization very difficult (b). 
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a/ Conditions for a coherent functioning of the EU : coordination/centralization of the 
budgetary and fiscal policies, and reinforcement of budgetary federalism 
Negative spillover effects of the EU functioning make collective cost sharing necessary by 
reinforcing budgetary federalism and coordination/centralization of economic policy (MUET 
P.-A, 1995) (VAN DER PLOEG F., 1993) (WALSH C., 1993,) (WALSH C., 
REICHENBACH H. et alii). This is the lesson drawn from several experiences of monetary 
unification, especially the Japanese monetary unification and more recently the German one.  
Coordination and centralization of economic policy allow taking in charge costs related to 
lack of coordination previously analyzed: public sector’s decreasing size and loss of capacity 
to stabilize economy in the event of symmetric or asymmetric shock. Federalist theory posits 
that among three recognized functions of economic policy – allocation of goods and services, 
redistribution of income, and stabilization policies – the last two should be controlled by the 
central power. In the case of the European Union this would mean centralizing redistribution 
and stabilization functions. Concerning stabilization policies, especially budgetary 
stabilization policy, at least three major arguments are put forward by federalist theory 
justifying their centralization (GOODHEART C., SMITH S., 1993). 
1/ The policies of budgetary stabilization conducted by each individual state result in 
important negative spillover effects at the level of the other states of a federation or of a union 
depending on the degree of opening of these economies. Centralized stabilization strategies 
are therefore likely to have much more important effects on the economic cycle. 
2/ Owing to the greater degree of integration of the national (federal) capital market, a local 
(national) decision to resort to debt-funded financing is likely to result in a bigger increase in 
the external debt of the region (state) than if it had been made at the centralized level. It 
should therefore result in a maximization of the real income allocated to reimbursements. 
3/ The centralization of the monetary and budgetary policies makes it possible to have a more 
efficient policy mix, enabling the monetary and budgetary authorities to negotiate the 
simultaneous use of their instruments.  
For lack of centralization, - taking into account the spillover effects linked to the national 
economic policies, particularly the budgetary ones, and to the necessity to stabilize the 
demand in case of a shock - the coordination of fiscal policies together with that of the other 
instruments of economic policy appears absolutely necessary. No significant measure aiming 
at a real centralization of budgetary policies has been planned in the European treaties. 
Regarding fiscal policy many studies have concluded that the optimal level – between 
federalism and devolution – is achieved when certain taxes are centralized. Given the 
externalities related to national economic policy, in the absence of actual centralization, at 
least some coordination seems necessary.  
 
In the least centralized OECD countries expenditure by central government represents at least 
30% of GNP. In the United States the federal budget exceeds the total budget of states and 
local authorities. Expenditure on goods and services by federal government accounts for about 
40% of such expenditure by public bodies. Looking more specifically at expenditure linked to 
the stabilization function, Sachs and Sala-i-Martin observe that in the United States when a 
fiscal region suffers a real drop in its GNP following a downturn, federal transfers compensate 
40% of the loss, mainly thanks to the progressive nature of income tax (PISANY FERRY, J. 
1993). In contrast the EU’s budget is minute. It does not exceed 2% of the GNP of member 
states (WYPLOSZ C., 1990). 
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b/ The obstacles in the way of better coordinated organization of the European policy 
mix  
 
Obviously greater coordination of economic policy in Europe would involve major 
difficulties. The first relates to the large number of jurisdictions concerned by the 
coordination process, namely the ECB and the many national budgetary authorities. The 
second is due to the risk of asymmetry in the perception of the nature of economic shocks by 
the various authorities involved in the process. The risk may be considerable given the 
diversity of the shocks with which European countries can cope. Another obstacle to grater 
coordination as well as to centralization of the European policy mix is heterogeneity in 
preferences of different European peoples. 
 
Coordination and à fortiori centralisation of economic policy also involve considerable – 
monetary and non-monetary costs for the more developed European countries, which explain 
their lack of willingness to move forward to a more integrated economic policy 
(KABABJIAN G., 1994; STERDYNIAK H. and VILLA P. 1993; VAN DER PLOEG, 1993; 
AGLIETTA M., 1996)).  
 
The increased budgetary federalism would require a transfer of resources from member states 
to the European budget. This would enable, in particular, stabilization policies to be deployed 
at a European level or indeed transfers to be made in the event of asymmetric shocks. A large 
part of the cost of transferring resources from member states to the Community budget would 
be borne by the most highly developed EU countries, given the current structure of resources 
and budget expenditure. A large share (about 70%) of the EU’s budget resources come from 
contributions by member states proportionate to GDP. In turn most of the expenditure by the 
EU budget consists of expenditure related to the Common Agricultural Policy and Regional 
Policy – respectively 46% and 40% of the total. This expenditure mainly benefits countries 
with the least well developed economies. The share of developed countries in budget 
resources being larger than their share of expenditure, they are net contributors to the EU 
budget. The structure of resources and budget expenditure is the result of compromises 
reached among European states during the negotiations leading up to the start of the Common 
market and subsequently the Single market. The position of the richest EU countries, which 
are net contributors, explains their negative attitude regarding increased coordination of 
budgetary policy.  
 
Intermediate levels of budgetary federalism are possible – halfway between the current EU 
system and federal states. In particular it has been proposed to set up – in the absence of a 
significant federal budget – automatic stabilization mechanisms paid for by member states to 
compensate asymmetric shocks. Such mechanisms would not be costly – less than 1% of 
contributing countries’ GDP – and though wielding less stabilizing power than in federal 
states, they would nevertheless be significant (MUET P.-A., 1995). Other proposals advocate 
better organization of Euro zone economic policy, with for instance the setting up of an 
Economic Policy Council bringing together Euro zone finance ministers. This council would 
enjoy decision-making powers over budgetary policy orientations and the overall thrust of 
economic policy in the Euro zone. Council decisions would not be legally binding, given the 
treaties currently in force. But non-compliance would nevertheless carry “on account of the 
transparent, official nature of decisions, high political costs in terms of reputation and 
credibility” (JACQUET P., PISANI-FERRY, 2000).  
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Contrary to the costs of greater coordination of budgetary policy, the cost of harmonizing 
fiscal policy would be borne mainly by the least developed EU countries. In their struggle to 
catch up, the smallest nations resort to fiscal competition, often followed by their more 
powerful neighbours. The smaller countries are therefore hostile to any significant attempt to 
harmonize fiscal rules, particularly with respect to capital taxation. 
 
Another major obstacle holding back the development of budgetary federalism is the fact that 
such development impinges on key attributes of the nation state. It would require EU States, 
especially in the most highly developed countries, to abandon a substantial amount of 
sovereignty. The nature of political power itself and the main issues at stake hinge on raising 
and allocating taxation. “Taxation expresses and nurtures political sovereignty; it has 
gradually imposed parliamentary representation, making parliament the place where 
budgetary and fiscal policies are framed” (DELESSY H., LERAIS F., STERDYNIAK H., 
1994). Nations states constitute a space in which various forms of solidarity are deployed. 
Such solidarity, which has taken time to develop, is the result of social struggle and is rooted 
in a community of language, culture and history. The first obstacle in the way of any transfer 
of sovereignty, as part of greater budgetary federalism, is the resistance of competent national 
bodies – national parliaments and governments in the more developed European countries - 
determined to protect their powers. The second hurdle is the as yet limited legitimacy of 
European institutions in the eyes of European public opinion. This shortfall in legitimacy is 
due to inadequate control exerted by the European Parliament over the the Commission on the 
one hand and on the other, over the EU budget. The Parliament only has an advisory role in a 
large number of fields. Furthermore, mandatory expenditure, on which Parliament is not 
consulted, represents the lion’s share of expenditure. 
 
Lastly globalization and the growing control over European states exerted by multinational 
capital are contributing to the current blockage in the process of integrating the European 
policy mix.  Freedom of capital movements enhances the mobility of capital and its ability to 
arbitrate at any given point in time between markets and stocks. This profoundly changes the 
balance of power between the owners of the means of production and employees, and 
between shareholders and managers, to the advantage of shareholders. It greatly increases the 
power shareholders may wield to sanction business strategies or state policies deemed 
contrary to their interests, thus consolidating the control of capital over European States. 
Capital’s growing control over states has accentuated the neo-liberal bias of public policy: 
continued tax relief for business, privatization of banks and public corporations, rethinking of 
pay-as-you-go retirement systems, reforms to “flexibilize” labour markets. The discourse of 
European governments seeks, aided and abetted by the opaque workings of EU institutions, to 
give credence to the idea that Brussels is behind these policies. Admittedly the influence of 
corporate lobbies on the Commission is not only a well-established fact; it has become a part 
of the institution itself. Responsibility for the neo-liberal bias of European policy should 
however be mainly borne by member States, given their weight in the decision-making 
process. The discourse of European governments fuels public disaffection towards the 
European project, whereas the reforms needed to “rationalize” the policy mix can only be 
implemented with the largest possible support among European peoples.  
 
Financial globalization thus contributes to establishing market forces and capital, particularly 
its most international segments, in the place of states at the heart of the European integration 
process (SIFAKIS – KAPETANAKIS C., 2007). These segments are supposed to henceforth 
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become the driving force of the process. However, the perimeter of the interests of capital is 
set by the constraint of its valorisation. The aim of the capital, being the maximization of 
profit, limits its horizon to the direct determinants of its valorisation. Capital cannot not be the 
driving force of projects bearing a strong political, almost visionary dimension, such as the 
deepening of European integration. Financial globalization even leads to a divergence of 
interests between the globalized segments of European capital and greater European 
integration. Deregulation of capital transfers in Europe encourages a process of delocalization 
and globalization of European firms. During the 1986-99 period acquisitions by European 
firms mainly targeted international rather than European companies (Sachwald, 2004). 
Furthermore the vast majority – about 70% – of strategic alliances involving European firms 
in the 1990s concerned partners outside Europe (OCDE, 2001). This suggests that the 
dominant trend for firms is towards greater globalization, rather than European. As a result 
the whole planet, not Europe, becomes the relevant space for the reproduction of European 
capital. Europe’s multinational firms also derive considerable benefit from a situation in 
which the tax systems of individual nations are forced to compete, due to the lack of fiscal 
harmonization in the EU. European capital also benefits from the decline in labour’s 
bargaining power and the advance of neo-liberal policies in Europe, made possible by 
financial globalization. Lastly globalization of finance and production encourage fiscal 
competition, by consolidating the position of European countries that oppose any attempt to 
question this trend. Harmonization of taxes on capital would only have a limited effect as long 
as capital can still move freely all over the world. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The aim) of this study is to analyze the reasons why the functioning of the EU lacks economic 
coherence. 
We have shown that the functioning of the EU generates growing costs and risks for the 
member countries. These costs and risks are essentially supported by the less developed 
countries and first by the countries of southern Europe: costs in terms of growth and 
competitivity as well as in their ability to stabilize the economy in case of asymmetrical 
shocks. These costs make for the accumulation of real and financial disequilibria i.e. growing 
deficits in the balance of trade and the current accounts balance, increased indebtedness of 
public and private agents. The problem of the sovereign debts is made much worse by the 
attacks on the financial markets and has serious economic and social consequences for these 
countries i.e. economic recession, rising unemployment, de tricot age of the Welfare State, 
pauperization of the middle classes, emigration. 
But the functioning of the EU begins to generate growing costs for some of the founder 
countries of the EU as well, such as Italy but also and particularly, France. The increase in 
financial imbalances inside the EU also generates negative spillovers in the whole Union. 
These spillovers involve growing costs for the dominant countries which until recently were 
the major beneficiaries of the single currency. Therefore the balance sheet of the present 
functioning of the EU is beginning to turn globally negative. 
We have also shown that the Eurozone is deadlocked today. The costs and imbalances 
generated by the functioning of the EU make the experiment in European monetary 
unification unsustainable. On the other hand the costs of a « rationalization » of the 
experiment which would guarantee its viability make this « rationalization » very difficult to 
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achieve. Indeed the « rationalization » of the functioning of the EU depends on an increased 
integration of the policy mix. This integration has important – monetary and non- monetary – 
costs which would be supported by the dominant countries. These costs themselves induce a 
non-cooperative attitude which accounts for the stagnation of the integration process. 
Finally the present deadlock of the Eurozone shows the limits of the theories of «engrenage » 
or « creative imbalance » (Monnet's method) which have conceptualized but also provided the 
guidelines for the European construction: the problem is to set member states goals which 
appear desirable and easily attainable such as the single market or the single currency. 
Achieving these goals requires that the States abandon part of their sovereignty and therefore 
be deprived progressively of their power i.e. « entrapping the states » (COHEN E., 1994; 
COHEN B., 1977 ). 
It is evident that these « theories » can be valid only as long as the increased integration of the 
European construction operates in the direction of the interests of the two leading countries. 
Once the « traps » are prejudicial to their interests – even if only one country is concerned - 
the consensus is broken and the process of European unification is at a standstill. 
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